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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
There are two questions presented for review: 
1. Whether the applicability of Section 78-40-2, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953), may be raised for the first time on appeal. 
2. Whether a Utah general partnership, through its 
managing partner who has both actual and constructive notice of a 
pending quiet title action affecting seven acres of real property 
subject to an executory real estate contract, can continue to 
make payments on that property and acquire legal title to the 
property, while the quiet title action is still pending, from an 
interloper whose interest in the seven acres is directly 
challenged in the quiet title action and whose interest is 
ultimately stipulated by the managing partner, through his 
attorney, to be nothing and judgment is entered accordingly. 
The panel of the Court of Appeals has tacitly decided 
that the applicability of Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
may not be raised for the first time on appeal. This tacit 
decision is in conflict with Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline 
Construction, 754 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1988). 
Furthermore, the panel of the Court of Appeals has 
tacitly decided that one who continues to make payments on real 
property subject to an executory real estate contract and 
acquires legal title to that property, while the quiet title 
action is still pending, from an interloper whose interest in the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
property is directly challenged ; in the quiet title action and 
whose interest is ultimately determined to be nothing, acquires 
that legal title to the property regardless of the disposition of 
that property made by the trial court. This tacit decision is in 
conflict with these decisions of the Utah Supreme Court: 
Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300 (Utah 1982); 
Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills, 590 P.2d 
1244 (Utah 1979); and 
Glynn v. Dubin, 369 P.2d 930 (Utah 1962). 
This tacit decision is also in conflict with this decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals: 
Blodgett v. Zions First National Bank, 752 P.2d 901 
(Utah App. 1988). 
This tacit decision seriously affects the integrity of 
judicial proceedings In rem. Property which is before the trial 
court for disposition can be validly alienated away by one before 
the court whose interest is ultimately determined to be nothing 
to another who has both actual and constructive notice of those 
in rem proceedings while those proceedings are still pending. 
CITATION TO OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals 
can be found at 146 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah App. 1990). 
i 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
The decision of the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals 
was entered in this case on October 19, 1990. No rehearing was 
requested. No order granting an extension of time within which 
to petition for certiorari has been entered. 
Section 78-2-2(b), Utah Code Ann. (1989), is believed 
to confer jurisdiction upon the Utah Supreme Court to review the 
decision in question by a writ of certiorari. 
CONTROLLING STATUTE 
Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides: 
In any action affecting the title to, or 
the right of possession of, real property the 
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint 
or thereafter, and the defendant at the time 
of filing his answer when affirmative relief 
is claimed in such answer, or at any time 
afterward, may file for record with the 
recorder of the county in which the property 
or some part thereof is situated a notice of 
the pendency of the action, containing the 
names of the parties, the object of the 
action or defense, and a description of the 
property in that county affected thereby. 
From the time of filing such notice for 
record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer 
of the property affected thereby be deemed to 
have constructive notice of the pendency of 
the action, and only of its pendency against 
parties designated by their real names. 
(Emphasis added.) 
3 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an action to quiet title to seven acres of real 
property located in Summit County, Utah. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
1. On April 6, 1983, Steven W. Major ("Weber")1 filed 
a complaint to quiet title to eleven parcels of real estate 
located in Summit County. Snyderville West ("Snyderville"), a 
Utah general partnership, and Jim Gaddis ( "Gaddis" ) , 
Snyderville' s managing partner, were two of seventy named 
defendants. (R. 0001-0021; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40) 
2. On April 11, 1983, Weber recorded a Lis Pendens 
describing the eleven parcels of real property. By Order entered 
March 19, 1990, Judge Regnal W. Garff of the Utah Court of 
Appeals granted Plaintiff/Appellant fs Motion to Supplement the 
Record to include the lis pendens. The seven acres were 
described as Parcel 6 In the Lis Pendens. (R. 0664-0682: 1 4; 
Appendix WA" hereto) 
1. Steven W. Major died and Brenda Major Weber was named as 
successor Personal Representative in 1984. (R. 0378-0383; 146 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 43, ft. 1) 
4 
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3. By order dated December 17, 1983, the trial court 
allowed service by publication upon Snyderville and sixteen other 
named defendants. Counsel for Weber could not determine the 
identity of any agent to serve on Snydervillefs behalf. (R. 
0264-0282; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41 and 43, ft. 6) 
4. The trial court entered a default judgment against 
Snyderville on August 29, 1985. (R. 0432-0435, 0444-0454; 146 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 41) 
5. On October 2, 1985, following lengthy negotiations 
among twenty-six of the developer defendants, Gaddis, through his 
attorney, entered into a complex Stipulation for Settlement 
providing that the seven acres vest in Weber. (R. 0479-0525) 
6. On January 17, 1986, Judgment was entered quieting 
title to the seven acres in Weber. (R. 0552-0572: 11 2 and 3-
Exhiblt "C" thereto; R. 0837-0966: 11 8, 11 and 12) 
C. Disposition in The Lower Courts 
1. In the fall of 1988, Snyderville sought to have 
the default judgment against it set aside. (R. 0573-0633, 0637-
0977; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41) The district court determined 
that there was "no adequate explanation . . . [for the] failure 
to personally serve Snyderville West at its known tax address" 
and set aside the judgment. (R. 0979-0989; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
41) 
5 
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2. In 1989, Snyderville filed a Motion to Dismiss 
premised on Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), 
which was granted. (R. 0996-1022; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41) 
3. This appeal followed, (R. 1023-1029; 146 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 41) 
4. A panel of the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the 
trial court, holding that: 1) service of process upon Jim Gaddis 
in his individual capacity did not effect service of process 
upon, nor confer jurisdiction over, Snyderville; 2) service by 
publication was inappropriate where no personal inquiry was made 
at Snydervillefs last known address within the state; 3) since 
service by publication on Snyderville was not warranted, such 
service was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over 
Snyderville and the default judgment against it was void; and 4) 
Weber raised no argument demonstrating error in dismissal on Rule 
12(b)(5) grounds. (146 Utah Adv. Rep. 40-43) 
5. The panel found no merit in Weber's lis pendens 
argument, raised for the first time in her reply brief. (146 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 43, ft. 3) 
D. Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. From 1978 to the present, Gaddis has held a ten 
percent interest in Snyderville and has been its managing 
6 
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partner, (R. 0664-0682: %% 1 and 2; R. 1031: 11-14; R. 0582-
0633, Exhibit "A" thereto (R. 0598); 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40) 
2. For $120,000, in 1978, Snyderville purchased from 
Investor Associates seven acres, a portion of the property at 
issue in the quiet title action. Robert W. Major ("Major") 
executed the pertinent real estate contract on behalf of Investor 
Associates. Major died on March 20, 1980. Immediately 
thereafter, Joseph L. Krofchek ("Krofchelc"), an interloper, 
purportedly transferred to himself all right, title and interest 
in property belonging to Investor Associates, including the seven 
acres. Snyderville took possession of the seven acres in 1978 
and made timely payments until Majorfs death; thereafter, 
payments continued, albeit to different payees, with the final 
payment of $32,210.10 being made on July 10, 1983. In October 
1983, Snyderville recorded a warranty deed for the seven acres 
given to it by Joseph L. Krof chek. In the quiet title action 
Krofchek's interest was directly challenged and was ultimately 
stipulated by Gaddis, through his attorney to be nothing. (R. 
0001-0021: %% 1, 8-10, 14-17 Exhibit "B" thereto; R. 1031: 23-
30, Exhibits 3, 6, 7 and 8 thereto; R. 0479-0525, 0552-0572, 
0526-0551; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40) 
3. Weber paid the real property taxes on the seven 
acres for the years 1986 and 1987. (R. 0664-0682: % 12; 
7 
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R. 0653-0658: 1 3) When it paid the real property taxes in 
1987, Snyderville learned that the trial court had divested it of 
title by means of the default judgment against it. (R. 0600; 146 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 40) 
4. Prom the time it took possession of the subject 
property in 1978, Snyderville's address had been correctly listed 
as Gaddis's office address on the Summit County tax records. (R. 
0274, 0279, 0600, 0992, 0995; R. 1030: 38-39; R. 1031: 13-14; 146 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 40-41) 
5. No filing in the appropriate county or state 
offices revealed the name of any individual affiliated with 
Snyderville nor did Snyderville have a telephone directory 
listing. Although Gaddis was served in his individual capacity 
at his office on May 11, 1983, the summons served upon him was 
directed to him individually and made no reference to Snyderville 
except in the lengthy caption listing all seventy defendants. 
The return of service indicated that Gaddis had been served 
personally and did not purport that service on Snyderville had 
been effected through him. By order dated December 17, 1983, the 
trial court allowed service by publication upon Snyderville and 
4 
sixteen other named defendants. (R. 1031: 13-15, 22, 32-33, 
Exhibit 11 thereto; R. 0664-0682: % 3; R. 0731-0825, Exhibit "A" 
thereto; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41) 
i 
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6. As a corollary to service by publication, counsel 
for Weber prepared a summons for mailing to Snyderville at its 
tax address, i.e., Gaddis's office at 1253 East 2100 South in 
Salt Lake City. (R. 1030: 50-54; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41) 
7. The affidavit of mailing listed Snydervillefs 
address as "1253 East 7100 South," incorrectly stating the south 
coordinate by fifty blocks. Although there is no such address, 
and, according to a Postal Service supervisor's affidavit, the 
summons directed to Snyderville should have been returned by the 
Postal Service, counsel for Weber did not recall that the summons 
had been returned, although other summonses were returned. The 
Postal Service does not keep records of returned first class mail 
and it is therefore unknown if the mailed summons ever reached 
Snyderville. Gaddis had no recollection of receiving a summons 
through the mail. (R. 0300-0330, 1 4(e); R. 1030: 13, 54-55; R. 
0714-0715; R. 0600; R. 1031: 44-45; R. 0736-0737; 146 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 41) 
8. The trial court entered a default judgment against 
Snyderville on August 29, 1985. Pursuant to negotiations and the 
Stipulation for Settlement entered by Gaddis, through his 
attorney, on January 26, 1986, Judgment was entered quieting 
title to the seven acres in Weber. In the fall of 1988, 
Snyderville sought to have the judgment set aside. The district 
9 
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court determined that there was "no adequate explanation . . . 
[for the] failure to personally serve Snyderville West at its 
known tax address" and set aside the judgment- In 1989, 
Snyderville filed a Motion to Dismiss premised on Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), which was granted. This appeal followed. 
(See If B.4, B.5, B.6, C.l# C.2 and C.3 hereinabove - Course of 
Proceedings and Disposition In The Lower Courts) 
9. On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Weber 
claimed that Snyderville was effectively served through personal 
service upon Jim Gaddis or, alternatively, that it was properly 
served by publication. Weber challenged the trial court's order 
of dismissal in favor of Snyderville as improper under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a). In her reply brief, Weber also claimed that 
Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), was determinative of the 
action. (See %% C.4 and C.5 hereinabove - Disposition in The 
Lower Courts) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPLICABILITY OF A STATUTE MAY 
BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL. 
4 
In Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Construction, 
754 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1988), Judge Orme addressed whether a 
statute's inapplicability could be raised for the first time on 
i 
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appeal. Together with Judge Bench and Judge Howard, Judge Orme 
wrote: 
. . . Appellants have raised for the 
first time on appeal the inapplicability of 
the procurement code. Ordinarily, arguments, 
positions, and issues may not be raised for 
the first time on appeal. See, e.g., 
Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 
1983); Conder v. A. L. Williams & Assocs., 
Inc. , 739 P.2d 634, 637 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987. That doctrine is not, however, applied 
in a vacuum. Where some countervailing 
principle is to be served, the doctrine must 
occasionally yield. See, e.g., UWC Assoc, v. 
Home Sav. & Loan, 7 8 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 8 
(1988). 
754 P.2d at 674 
In Cox, appellants raised for the first time on appeal 
the inapplicability of the Utah Procurement Code, Section 63-56-1 
to -73, and its payment bond requirements, Section 14-1-13, Utah 
Code Ann. Judge Orme compared the circumstances in Cox to the 
case of Robbins v. Sonoma County Flood Control & Water Cons. 
District, 138 Cal. 291, 292 P.2d 52, 56 (Cal. App. 1956): 
. . . [A] pleading must be tested, not 
by what it says as to the effect of [public 
laws and public acts], but by the contents of 
the laws and acts themselves." 
754 P.2d at 675. 
See also Maynard Investment Co. v. McCann, 465 P.2d 657, 660-661 
11 
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(Wash, 1970); and Huntress v. Huntress1 Estate, 235 F.2d 205, 209 
(7th Cir. 1956). 
In Cox, Judge Orme examined the contents of the 
statutes themselves, held that they were not applicable and 
reversed the decision of the trial court. The case was remanded 
for a determination of whether additional evidence should be 
received. 
In James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987) 
Judge Garff articulated principles for determining when and under 
what circumstances a new issue might be considered: 
• • . In Utah, matters not raised in the 
pleadings nor put in issue at the trial may 
not be raised for the first time on appeal, 
Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 
758 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire 
Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). A 
matter is sufficiently raised if it has been 
submitted to the trial court and the trial 
court has had the opportunity to make 
findings of fact or law. See Turtle 
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 
645 P. 2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982). "Theories or 
issues which are not apparent or reasonably 
discernible from the pleadings, affidavits 
and exhibits will not be considered." 
Minnehoma Fin. Co. v. Pauli, 565 P.2d 835, 
838 (Wyo. 1977). In particular, even if 
pleadings are generously interpreted, if they 
are not supported by any factual showing or 
by the submission of legal authority, they 
are not presented for decision. Intf 1 
Business Mach. Corp. v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 
194, 677 P.2d 507, 510 (1964). Further, the 
rule that a legal theory may not be raised 
for the first time on appeal is "to be 
12 
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stringently applied when the new theory 
depends on controverted factual questions 
whose relevance thereto was not made to 
appear at trial." Boqacki v. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3d 771, 489 P.2d 537, 
543-44, 97 Cal. Rptr. 657, 663-64 (1971), 
cert, denied, 405 U.S. 1030, 92 S.Ct. 1301, 
31 L.Ed.2d 488 (1972); see also Campbell v. 
Graham-Armstrong, 9 Cal.3d 482, 509 P.2d 689, 
107 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1973); Church v. Roemer, 
94 Idaho 782, 498 P.2d 1255, 1258-59 (1972). 
In order for a theory to be considered on appeal, then, 
certain requirements must be met: 
1. The matter must have been either raised in the 
pleadings or put in issue at trial. 
2. If a matter is put at issue and submitted to the 
trial court, the trial court must have had an opportunity to make 
findings of fact or law. 
3. The theory or issue must be apparent or reasonably 
discernible from the pleadings. 
4. A matter raised in a pleading must be supported 
either by a factual showing or the submission of legal authority. 
5. The theory or issue must not depend on facts that 
could have been controverted before the trial court. 
Here 
In this case, the matter of the Lis Pendens having been 
recorded on April 11, 1983 was raised in Paragraph 4 of Weber !s 
June 3, 1988 Statement of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
13 
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Defendant Snyderville West's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment. (R. 0664-0682, 14) 
The fact that the Lis Pendens had been recorded was a 
basic given before the trial court. Whether it had been recorded 
was never at issue. 
The doctrine of lis pendens is readily discernible from 
the undisputed fact that the Lis Pendens was recorded. The Lis 
Pendens was recorded pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-40-
2. The contents of that statute expressly set forth the doctrine ' 
of lis pendens. 
In its June 24, 1988 trial court Memorandum in 
Response, Snyderville did not dispute the fact that the Lis i 
Pendens had been recorded. (R. 0731-0825) In fact, on March 20, 
1990 Snyderville acknowledged before the Court of Appeals that 
the April 11, 1983 Lis Pendens was "a document incontrovertibly 
of record in the Summit County Recorder's Office." (Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant/Respondent 
Snyderville West's Motion to Disregard or Strike Reply Brief of 
Plaintiff/Appellant, p. 4 — Appendix "Cw hereto) Snyderville!s 
failure to dispute Weber's assertion that the Lis Pendens had 
been recorded amounted to a factual showing by Weber of the truth 
of that assertion. Utah law does not require that the recorded 
Lis Pendens be filed in the action of which it gives notice. 
14 
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Snyderville could not hdve controverted the fact of the 
Lis Pendens having been recorded. The document was 
uncontrovertibly of record in the Summit County Recorder's 
Office. 
Weber's Reply Brief presented a purely legal issue to 
the Court of Appeals: Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
governed the action. Where a purely legal issue is raised in a 
case for the first time before an appellate court, that case 
should be governed by the applicable law. See, e.g. , Vintero 
Corp. v. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento, 675 F.2d 513, 515 (2d 
Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (five cases from various circuits cited 
as authority for appellate consideration of new issues if 
additional facts not required, or pure legal issue involved; 
unjust enrichment issue considered when only argument for 
imposition of constructive trust raised below); Ricard v. Birch, 
529 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1975) (application of tolling statute 
could be raised for first time on appeal as exception to rule of 
nonreviewability) ; Burns v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 265 
Cal. App. 2d 98, 105-06, 71 Cal. Rptr. 326, 330 (1968) (court 
cited three prior decisions as precedent for permitting new 
issues of law to be raised first on appeal); Cronin v. Lindberg, 
66 111. 2d 47, 61, 360 N.E.2d 360, 366 (1976) (citing two prior 
decisions that allowed exceptions based on public importance of 
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legal issues to be raised on appeal); People ex rel. Sterba v. 
Blaser, 33 111. App. 3d 1, 10-11, 337 N.E.2d 410, 416 (1975) 
(court referred to one prior holding to support new legal issue 
being raised when all pertinent facts were before the court); 
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1969) (in 
interest of judicial economy, applicability of Voting Rights Act 
provision not precluded from consideration by failure to raise 
issue below where all facts undisputed); Telco Leasing, Inc. v. 
Transwestern Title Co., 630 F.2d 691, 693-94 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(where issue purely one of law and not affected by factual record 
below appellate court has discretion to consider for first time 
application of correct state statute concerning attorney's fees); 
Zinn v. Ex-Cell-0 Corp., 148 Cal. App. 2d 56, 82-83, 306 P.2d 
1017, 1034 (1957) (court permitted application of conflict of 
laws doctrine for first time on appeal); Higqinbotham v. Ford 
Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1976). "[T]he new theory 
raises a purely legal question. No facts could have been 
developed to aid our resolution of the issue. . . . Under these 
circumstances, we believe it would be unjust now to refuse to 
consider the new argument." Id. at 768 n.10. The Supreme Court 
of California stated: lf[W]hen as here the facts with reference 
to the contention newly made on appeal appear to be undisputed 
and that probably no different showing could be made on a new 
i 
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trial it is deemed appropriate to entertain the contention as a 
question of law on the undisputed facts and pass on it 
accordingly." Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal. 2d 337, 341, 302 
P.2d 738, 740 (1956); Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. , 24 Cal. App. 3d 35, 43, 100 Cal. Rptr. 791, 797 
(1972) (court permitted new argument based on provision of 
California Labor Act when all pertinent facts were before the 
court), afffd, 414 U.S. 117 (1973). 
This is such a case. The integrity of the judicial 
process in an iri rem proceeding should not be subverted by 
allowing an interloper who is a party to that proceeding to put 
property beyond the trial court's jurisdiction by means of a 
spurious deed to a general partnership whose managing partner has 
both actual and constructive notice that the property is before 
the court for disposition. 
This Court should issue a Writ of Certiorari to the 
Utah Court of Appeals to review and reverse that court's 
erroneous decision not to consider Weber's lis pendens argument. 
POINT II. 
BY VIRTUE OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIS 
PENDENS SET FORTH IN SECTION 7 8 - 4 0 -
2 , U T A H C O D E A N N . ( 1 9 5 3 ) , 
S N Y D E R V I L L E WAS BOUND BY THE 
STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT AND THE 
JANUARY 1 7 , 1986 JUDGMENT VESTING 
TITLE TO THE SEVEN ACRES IN WEBER. 
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The argument supporting this point is set forth in 
Point I of the Reply Brief of Appellant, which is included as 
Appendix "D" to this Petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The applicability of Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) and the doctrine of lis pendens contained therein is a 
purely legal issue which should have been considered by the panel 
of the Court of Appeals. Snyderville could not have disputed the 
fact of the Lis Pendens having been recorded on April 11, 1983. 
The Court of Appeals ordered that Weber's Motion to Supplement 
the Record to include the Lis Pendens be granted. 
This Court should grant Weber's Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari to preserve the integrity of the judicial process in 
quiet title proceedings. 
DATED: November 19, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted 
A. 
R0BERT7J. 0RT0N 
VIRGINIA C. LEE 
MARSDEN, 0RT0N, CAH00N & G0TTFREDS0N 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Hand delivered four (4) copies of this Petition of 
Plaintiff/Appellant for Writ of Certiorari to: 
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Richard A. Rappapout, Esq. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Fifth Floor 
525 East First South 
. P.O. Box 11008 
AJU Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
this day of November, 1990. Pursuant to Rules 45 through 49 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, each of those four (4) 
copies indicated on its cover the date of filing of the Petition 
and the Certiorari Docketing Number of the Utah Supreme Court. 
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APPENDIX 
Order and Motion to Supplement Record 
Opinion of the Panel of the Utah Court of Appeals; 146 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 40. 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Defendant/Respondent Snyderville West's Motion to Disregard 
or Strike Reply Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant 
Reply Brief of Appellant (Addendum "P" omitted) 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
? *: - 7 '!• -' ^  
Brenda Major Webb, 
Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Robert W. Major, 
Sr,. Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
English Inn Co., Inc., a 
Utah corporation, et al., 
Defendants, 
and 
Snyderville West, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
ORDER 
Case No. 890599-CA 
This matter is before the court on appellant's motion to 
supplement the record and respondent's motion to strike 
portions of appellant's reply brief. Respondent has filed an 
objection to the motion to supplement the record, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the motion to supplement the 
record is granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the motion to strike portions 
of appellant's reply brief is deferred until plenary 
presentatiorL-and consideration of the case. 
day of March, 1990. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of March, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail. 
Robert F. Orton 
Virgina Curtis Lee 
Marsden, orton & Cahoon 
Attorneys at Law 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Richard A. Rappaport 
William B. Wray, Jr., 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
525 East First South 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
DATED this 16th day of March, 1990. 
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ROBERT F. ORTON - #A2 4 33 
VIRGINIA C. LEE - #1923 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON 
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 34 101 
TELEPHONE : ( 801 ) f>2 I - .ifiOu 
COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENDA MAJOR WEBEk, 
Personal Representative of 
the Estate of ROF5ERT ¥i. 
MAJOR, SR., Deceased, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a 
Utah corporation, et a.l . , 
Defendants, 
and 
SNYDERVILLE WEST, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 890599-CA 
District Court 
No. 7325 
Priority: 14(b) 
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD 
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, P.I a .i nt i f f ' Appe.l 1 ant Brenda Major Weber, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert W. Major, Jr., Deceased, 
by and through counsel , hereby moves this Court for an Order 
Supplementing the Record on Appeal to include the Lis Pendens 
recorded with respect t>» this action on April 11, 1983. This 
Motion is brought for the following reasons: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1. In ht--r Statement of Points and Authorities in 
Opposition to Defendant: Snyderville West's Motion to Set Aside 
1 I  Default Judgment, the Personal Representative set forth in the 
2 Statement of Facts that on the 11th day of April, 1983, a Lis 
3 Pendens was recorded in the office of the Recorder of Summit 
4 County, State of Utah with respect to said action. (R. 0664-
5 0682, <l! 4) 
6 2. In its Memorandum in Response, Snydervil]e West 
7 did not dispute this fact. (R. 0731-0825) 
8 3. In her Brief of Appellant, the Personal 
9 I Representative again sterlet the fact that on April 11, 1983, the 
Personal Representative caused a Lis Pendens regarding the quiet 
H I title action to 'be recorded in the Summit County Recorder1 s 
12
 I Office. (Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 18) 
1 3 II 4, in its Brief of Respondent, Snyderville West does 
not dispute this fact. 
5. Section 7H--40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides 
for filing a lis pendens for record with the recorder of the 
county in which the property is situated, but does not require a 
copy of the lis pendens to be filed with the court in which the 
action is pending. 
6. The Iijs Pendens recorded with respect to this 
10 
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16 
17 
18 
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action was styled as a pleading in the action and a copy is 
attached as Exhibit "A" hereto. 
1 II 7. Appellant believes that the Lis Pendens would be 
2 helpful to this Court in definitively establishing the undisputed 
3 fact it was recorded and that it concerned the subject seven 
4 acres. 
5 8. In her Keply Brief of Appellant, the Personal 
6 Representative argues that the recorded Lis Pendens gave 
7 Snyderville West conr. t runt i vt.» notice of the pendency of this 
8 action affecting its equitable title to the seven acres, and that 
9 together with the actual notice Snyderville West had through its 
10 managing partner, James R. Gaddis, Snyderville West is bound by 
11 the results set forth in the January 17, 1986 Judgment. 
12 DATED: February 2G, 1990. 
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ROBER-fT ORToY 
15 I VIKGINI^C. LEE 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON 
16 " 
17 I CERTIFICATE OF ..SERVICE 
Mailed a true and correct copy of this Motion to 
Supplement Record to: 
Richard A. Rappaport 
William B. Wray, Jr. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Fifth Floor 
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5 25 Eas t IVirsi: South 
P.O. Box 1 1 ooi; 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
do r.';io;.'/ < 
of ihat c-;r:: 
which :v-
being Er 
IN • 
cfficiai t.. 
ro'^r m pr.d for Summit County. St.Me of Utah, 
..•:-.'. .,:•.•;! for^jc-ii'.g is a full, true and correct copy 
*\ 
;*!T; 
A *\ 
' j \ 
^ ' V Page - V o l e 
mv hand and affixed my 
AWA ,c 
- o ^ y Recorder 
, 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
ROBERT F. ORTON 
T. RICHARD DAVIS 
MARSDEN. ORTON & LILJENOUIST 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
68 SOUTH MAIN. FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
T E L E P H O N E : (801) 521-3800 
Entry No 2 0 4 4 8 6 
Book MAS 7 p,g9 ,3 31-41 
REQUEST OF J?JJJ^^X)^^ . 
«FEE 
S-42 oo 
RECORDED "WR
1 
W SPFCQCS. S'J-vtflT CCMgCORQSa i 
<.2D M 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN W. MAJOR, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR., Deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a Utah 
Corporation; PARK CITY UTAH 
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation, 
CHARLES E. HIRSCH; HAROLD D. 
HIRSCH; SAM A. HEPNER, EUGENE H. 
POWERT; MASASHI HASHIDA; J. E. 
ROBERTS a/k/a JACK E. ROBERTS, 
FROSTWOOD LIMITED, a Utah 
Limited Partnership; J. L. 
KROFCHECK a/k/a JOSEPH L. 
KROFCHECK; ROBERT L. BARRETT; 
SNYDERVILLE WEST; PARTNERSHIP 
INVESTMENT OF COLORADO, INC., a 
Corporation; PARK WEST WATER 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non-Profit 
Corporation; HALBET ENGINEERING, 
INC., a California Corporation; 
HALBET PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; MAJOR-BLAKENEY 
CORPORATION, a California 
LIS PENDENS 
Civil No. 7336 
B00KM2 57PAGE236 
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Corporation; ASPEN GROVE, INC., a 
Utah Corporation; LESTER F. 
HEWLETT, JR.; RUTH BRAZIER HEWLETT; 
SNYDERVILLE LAND CO., a.Utah 
Limited Partnership; H. E. BABCOCK 
and J. E. ROBERTS d/b/a PARKWEST 
LAND COMPANY, INVESTOR ASSOCIATES, 
SYNDICATE, a Delaware Unincorpor-
ated Association; WILLIAM S. 
RICHARDS; MURRAY FIRST THRIFT AND 
LOAN COMPANY, a Utah Corporation; 
J, ROBERT WEST; LIFE RESOURCES, 
INC., an Oregon Corporation; KARL 
C. LESUEUR; H. J. SAPERSTEIN, 
TRUSTEE; PEOPLES FINANCE & THRIFT 
COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY, a Utah 
Corporation; WAYLAND P. CALKINS; 
BARBARA CALKINS; McGHIE LAND TITLE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Trustee, AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES 
OF UTAH, INC., a Utah Corporation; 
JOHN CANEPARI; KERRY D. BODILY; 
SKI PARK CITY WEST, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; NATIONAL PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah Corpor-
ation; ENSIGN COMPANY, a California 
Limited Partnership; ROBERT W. 
ENSIGN? CITY DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, a Corporation; 
WESTERN STATES TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah Corporation; J. TAYLOR LOTT 
a/k/a JOHN TAYLOR LOTT; UTAH TITLE 
& ABSTRACT COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation; PARK WEST ASSOCIATES, 
a Utah General Partnership; JAMES 
WEBSTER ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; JAY BAKER d/b/a JAY 
BAKER ELECTRIC; RYDER STILLWELL; 
DIANA L. LESUEUR; A. J, SLAGEL 
a/k/a ZELLA J. SLAGEL; RAY WINN; 
JOHN MULLER; GERALD W. WALTERS; 
NEW YORK INVESTORS, INC., a New 
York Corporation; MICHAEL SPURLOCK; 
DORIE SPURLOCK; MARIA KROFCHECK; 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 24, Inclusive; 
and all other persons unknown 
claiming any right, title, or 
B00KM2 57PAGEZ3 7 
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interest in or lien against the real 
'property described in Plaintiff's 
Complaint adverse to Plaintiff's 
ownership or clouding his title 
thereto; PARK CITY WEST ASSOCIATION, 
a Utah Corporation; CITY DEVELOPMENT 
CO., INC., a Utah Corporation; 
STANDARD INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a 
California Corporation; GREAT 
NORTHERN LAND CORPORATION, a 
California Corporation; INN 
INVESTORS, a Partnership; TITLE 
INSURANCE AGENCY, a Utah Corporation; 
REESE HOWELL; AMERICAN SAVINGS & 
LOAN, a Utah Corporation; JOE COX; 
JIM GADDIS; SAM WILSON; HENRY 
WINKLER; and JOHN DOES 2 5 through 
50, Inclusive, 
Defendants. 
TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Notice is hereby given that an action has been commenced 
in the above-entitled Court, by the above-named Plaintiff against 
the above-named Defendants, which suit is now pending; that one of 
the objects of said suit is to quiet title in the Estate of Robert 
W. Major, Jr., Deceased, to real property situated in Summit 
County, State of Utah, specifically described in Exhibit "A" which 
is attached hereto. 
DATED THIS £'*L day of April, 1983. 
jQ 
ROBERT F. ORTON 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
- 3 -
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On t h i s day of A p r i l , 1983 , p e r s o n a l l y appeared 
b e f o r e me ROBERT F. ORTON, s i g n e r of the f o r e g o i n g I n s t r u m e n t , 
who duly acknowledged t o me t h a t he executed t h e same. 
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NOTARY PUBLIC 1/0 > Z "1 " 7 ~ 
'l/4:\ \ Residing a t : sddUtf /\<LA^ n&JAAAJbTj 
•'•£.$•/.'''''•/ \ 
' *-•.';S/m.\ . \ i i  t : 
rAfi$'COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
OF 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Parcel No, 1: 
Lot A, Lots 18 thru 19, 22 thru 24, 28 thru 38, PAPJC CITY VEST SUBDIVISION 
NO. 1, according to the official plat thereof on file and of record in the 
office of the Sumait County Recorder, State of Utah. 
Parcel No. 2: 
Lots 1 thru A,, 17 thru 25, PARK CITY UEST SUBDIVISION NO. 2, according to the 
official plat thereof on file and of record in the office of the Summit County 
Recorder, State of Utah. Also, THE KAIL, PAPJC CITY WEST SUBDIVISION NO. 2. 
Parcel No. 3; 
In Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian: 
Beginning at a point which is the NW corner of property conveyed to Spencer 
Osborne et ux., in a Special Warranty Deed recorded March 31, 1969, as Entry 
No. 108801, in Book M-2Q, page 389, O.R., said point being on the North line of 
said Section 1; thence Uest along said section line 432 feet; thence South 1° 
50* East 715 feet; thence East 410 feet, more or less, to a point which is 
directly South of the aforesaid beginning point; thence North in a straight 
line to the said point of beginning 713 feet, more or less. TOGETHER,WITH 
an Easement for ingress, egress and underground utilities as set forth in the 
.first paragraph on page 5 of that certain Judgment on Stipulation recorded as 
Entry No. 113601, Book M-32, pages 269-276, on July 26, 1971. 
Parcel No. 4; 
In Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian: 
The North 165 feet of the SW 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of the SW 1/4 of Section 36; 
and the South 1/2 of the NW 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of the SW 1/4 of Section 36; 
and the West 100 feet of the N 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 
of Section 36; and the North 330 feet of the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of the SW 
1/4 of Section 36. TOGETHER WITH an Easement for ingress, egress and under-
ground utilities as set forth in the second paragraph on page 5 of that cer-
tain Judgment on Stipulation recorded as Entry No. 113601, Book M-32, pages 
269-276, on July 26, 1971. 
Parcel No. 5; 
In Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian: 
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 25, Park City West Plat No. 2; thence 
North along the East line of said Plat No. 2 for 204 feet; thence East 160 
feet; thence South 204.00 feet; thence in a straight line West to the point of 
beginning. TOGETHER WITH an Easement 27.6 feet wide for ingress, egress and 
underground utilities, over a land strip lying 13.8 feet each side of a ccnuer-
line commencing at a point which is 173.8 feet East of the Southeast corner of 
Lot 25, Park City West Plat No. 2; thence 680.6 feet North, more or Jess, to 
a right of way south line, which right of way is known as "Major Drive" within 
said Park City West Plat No. 2, connecting with Park City West Tlat No. 1, said 
plats being recorded subdivision in the Submit County records. 
Parcel No. 6: 
Part of the Southwest quarter of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, 
part of the Northwest quarter Section 6, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, and 
part of Northeast quarter of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East oC the • 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian described as follows: Beginning at the Southwest ^  
corner of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meri-N. 
dicn, Suaunit County, Utah, ant! running thonce North along Section line 502.3 
r_...
 fci i«...... Qc;n nn f^r. ti.mro South 138.00 feet; thence West 482.80 
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Parcel No. 7* 
t rhP Southwest quarter oc Section 36, Township 1 South, 
su?££ r:"t^'£i srs—i. —«- «*5't-0 f«" "—"• 
Parcel No. 8; 
u i f « f PKA Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter 
5V52.*£f ££"££.•!£ fSTJ. — — - ™ -
Parcel Ko« 9s 
n / r-,-#. ciir Lake Base and Meridian, 
I„ Section 31. Township 1L South ange 4 E > ^ ^ ^ ^ , 
Beginning at a pomt on the fce" ^ " " J "
 st 0) t h e Southwest corner of said 
feet Slorch and 1,412.0 feet, ^ " " ^ ^ ^ e s t line of Highway 248 for 383.5 
Section 31; thence Northerly .1 ong th« -"J W e « J .„
 o n the W e s t l i n e of said 
£..tj thence West 1.4H| 0 fee . .ore or ^ ss t^a p ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Section 31; thence South 533.5 feet ^
 5 1 1 £ e e t n o t e o r less, 
thence East 901 feet; thence North 150 feet, tnen 
to the point of beginning hereof. 
Parcel No. lQt 
* . i , j { „ . Parcel Kutaber 1 and Parcel Number 2 , 
The r ight of vay and easement i n c l u u « J ^ \ e e d r e c o r d e d a s E Q t r y No. 
contained and described « ^ « J ^ „
 1 9 6 8 @ 9 : 2 5 A.M.. O.K. 
108283, in Boofc H-19, at Pages i»:> " ° > 
Parcel No. l i t 
CO 
2 
sX> 
CD 
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ORME, Judge: 
This is an appeal by plaintiff Brenda Major Weber1 
challenging interlocutory and final orders setting aside a 
default judgment in favor of plaintiff and dismissing defendant 
S n v d e r v i l l e W e s t ( " S n v H e r v i l 1 P * M acs a n a r h r *-n an a r f i ^ n t-n 
quiet title to real property. This appeal primarily focuses on 
the sufficiency of service of process on Snyderville. 
FACTS 
On April 6, 1983, Steven W. Major filed a complaint to 
quiet title to eleven parcels of real estate located in Summit 
1. This action was originally brought by Steven W. Major, 
personal representative of the estate of Robert W. Major, Jr 
During the course of the litigation Steven W. Major died and 
the present plaintiff was named as successor personal 
representative. 
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County. Snyderville, a Utah general partnership, and Jim 
Gaddis were two of seventy named defendants.2 Jim Gaddis 
holds a ten-percent interest in Snyderville and is its managing 
partner. 
In 1978, Snyderville purchased from Investor Associates a 
portion of the property at issue in the quiet title action. 
Robert W. Major executed the pertinent real estate contract on 
behalf of Investor Associates. Snyderville took possession of 
the property and made timely payments, with the final payment 
being made on July 20, 1983. In October 1983, Snyderville 
recorded a warranty deed for the property given to it by 
Investor Associates. Snyderville paid property taxes on the 
parcel through October 1987, when it learned that the trial 
court had divested it of title by means of a default judgment 
against it« 
From the time it took possession of the subject property 
in 1978, Snyderville's address had been correctly listed as 
Gaddis1s office address on the Summit County tax records. 
No filing in the appropriate county or state offices 
revealed the name of any individual affiliated with Snyderville 
nor did Snyderville have a telephone directory listing. 
Although Gaddis was served in his individual capacity at his 
office on May 11, 1983, the summons served upon him was 
directed to him individually and made no reference to 
Snyderville except in the lengthy caption listing all seventy 
defendants. The return of service indicated that Gaddis had 
been served personally and did not purport that service on 
Snyderville had been effected through him. By order dated 
December 17, 1983, the trial court allowed service by 
publication upon Snyderville and sixteen other named defendants. 
As a corollary to service by publication, counsel for 
Weber prepared a summons for mailing to Snyderville at its tax 
address, i.e., Gaddis's office at 1253 East 2100 South in Salt 
Lake City. 
2. As may be expected in litigation involving numerous parties 
and several transactions, the facts before the court are 
numerous and complicated. We commend counsel for both parties 
for their succinct presentation of the relevant facts. We 
further note that both parties1 careful compliance with Utah R. 
App. P. 24 has assisted the court in efficiently deciding the 
matters before it. Of particular assistance to the court was 
the comprehensive addenda of key documents annexed to the 
briefs. 
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The affidavit of mailing listed Snyderville•s address as 
"1253 East 7100 South," incorrectly stating the south 
coordinate by fifty blocks. Although there is no such address, 
and, according to a Postal Service supervisor's affidavit, the 
summons directed to Snyderville should have been returned by 
the Postal Service, counsel for Weber did not recall that the 
summons had been returned, although other summonses were 
returned for insufficient postage. The Postal Service does not 
keep records of returned first class mail and it is therefore 
unknown if the mailed summons ever reached Snyderville. Gaddis 
had no recollection of receiving a summons through the mail. 
The trial court entered a default -judgment against 
Snyderville on August 29, 1985. In the fall of 1988, 
Snyderville sought to have the judgment set aside. The 
district court determined that there was "no adequate 
explanation . . . [for the] failure to personally serve 
Snyderville West at its known tax address" and set aside the 
judgment. In 1989, Snyderville filed a Motion to Dismiss 
premised on Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), which was 
granted. This appeal followed. 
On appeal, Weber claims that Snyderville was effectively 
served through personal service upon Jim Gaddis or, 
alternatively, that it was properly served by publication. 
Weber also challenges the court's order of dismissal in favor 
of Snyderville as improper under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).3 
PERSONAL SERVICE 
Weber asserts that Gaddis*s position as managing partner 
of Snyderville qualified him to receive service of process for 
Snyderville. Weber further claims that service upon Gaddis 
automatically perfected service upon Snyderville by virtue of 
his position as managing partner and his status as a partner. 
We agree that Gaddis was authorized to receive process for 
Snyderville. See Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(5) (service upon a 
3. Weber also claims that, notwithstanding any deficiencies in 
service of process, Snyderville is bound by a stipulation for 
settlement and the judgment entered thereon on January 17, 
1986, by reason of the fact Gaddis, through his own counsel, 
was a party to the stipulation. We find no merit in this 
argument nor in Weber's lis pendens argument, raised for the 
first time in her reply brief. 
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partnership shall be effective through service upon managing or 
general agent). However, personal service upon Gaddis did not 
confer jurisdiction over Snydervillec Weber incorrectly 
focuses on Gaddis*s capacity, rather than the import of the 
summons served upon him. Any number of agents or partners of 
Snyderville might be authorized to receive service for the 
partnership, yet if no service is ever attempted on the 
partnership no service on it can be perfected.4 
Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, 
with our emphasis: "The summons shall contain the . . . names 
. . . of the parties to the action . . . [and] be directed to 
the defendant." Gaddis's summons was directed to him, not to 
Snyderville. While this might have provided Snyderville with 
constructive or even actual knowledge of the action, the 
insufficiency of process is not thereby cured. See Stone v. 
Hicks, 45 N.C. App. 66, 262 S.E.2d 318, 319 (1980) (where one 
defendant received a summons directed to another defendant, 
service was ineffective on the receiving defendant even though 
the caption listed him as a defendant). See generally 62B Am. 
Jur. 2d Process section 81 (1990). We hold that service of 
process upon Jim Gaddis in his individual capacity did not 
effect service of process upon, nor confer jurisdiction over, 
Snyderville. 
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION 
Rule 4(f)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in 
effect at all times pertinent to this case,5 authorized 
service by publication when personal service is impractical 
because the 
person upon whom service is sought resides 
outside of the state, or has departed from 
the state, or cannot after due diligence 
be found within the state . . . . 
4. Weber's claim that service on Gaddis was adequate to serve 
the partnership is belied by Weber's own course of conduct. If 
she believed Snyderville had been properly served through 
Gaddis there would have been no need to include it in the 
motion seeking leave to serve by publication, in the order 
authorizing publication or in the published summons, nor to 
undertake efforts to mail the published summons to Snyderville. 
5. The comparable rule now appears at Utah R. Civ. P. 4(g). 
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The party desiring service of process 
by publication shall file a motion 
verified by the oath of such party or 
someone in his behalf for an order of 
publication. It shall state the facts 
authorizing such service and shall show 
the efforts that have been made to obtain 
personal service within this state . . • . 
The court shall hear the motion ex parte 
and, if satisfied that due diligence has 
been used to obtain personal service 
within this state, or that efforts to 
obtain the same would have been of no 
avail, shall order publication of the 
summons in a newspaper having general 
circulation in the county in which the 
action is pending. 
Rule 4 requires the exercise of "due diligence" to locate 
the defendant before the court may authorize service by 
publication. "Due diligence must be tailored to fit the 
circumstances of each case. It is that diligence which is 
appropriate to accomplish the end sought and which is 
reasonably calculated to do so." Parker v. Ross, 117 Utah 417, 
217 P.2d 373, 379 (1950). See also Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 
1269, 1277 n.13 (Utah 1987). 
Counsel for Weber was faced with the task of sorting 
through numerous disorganized files containing Robert Major's 
personal and business affairs. Many documents were held by 
family members and former counsel. At the time of trial, 
counsel could not recall whether he had seen any documents 
specifically linking Snyderville and Gaddis or any contracts or 
deeds concerning the conveyance to Snyderville among the 
records he examined. 
Snyderville first came to plaintiffs counsel's attention 
in a June 1982 title report showing Snyderville1s interest. 
In an effort to locate information he considered 
necessary to serve Snyderville, counsel searched in telephone 
directories, motor vehicle files, corporate filings in Utah and 
California, the County Recorder's files in Summit and Salt Lake 
counties, and in postal records. It is apparent, however, that 
Snyderville's address was set forth in the Summit county tax 
records pertaining to the very property in issue. Counsel's 
quest was apparently for the name of a particular individual 
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tied to Snyderville through whom service upon Snyderville could 
be perfected. Oddly, however, no inquiry was made by counsel 
at the address disclosed as Snyderville*s address in the tax 
records, of which counsel had knowledge no later than October 
1983, nor was any service of process attempted on Snyderville 
at this address." Had either been done, Weber would readily 
have been able to personally serve Snyderville through Gaddis, 
whose office was the very address stated in the tax records. 
A plaintiff seeking authorization for service by 
publication on a defendant for whom an in-state address is 
known must, at a minimum, make inquiry at that address. Cf. 
Downev State Bank v. Maior-Blakeney Corp,. 545 P.2d 507, 509 
(Utah 1976) (plaintiff need not exhaust all possibilities where 
there is an effort to serve defendant at the only address 
reasonably known). This requirement is not only a prerequisite 
for satisfying the due diligence prong of Rule 4, but will also 
go a long way in establishing a proper factual record upon 
which the court may base its order for service by publication. 
Service by publication is inappropriate where no personal 
inquiry is made at a last known address within the state.7 
6« Apparently counsel thought that unless he could advise the 
constable of the name and title of a particular person through 
whom Snyderville could be served, he could not appropriately 
seek service of Snyderville at the address of which he was 
aware. A personal visit to the address would presumably have 
elicited such information. But such information is not 
necessarily required. Had counsel simply advised the constable 
to serve Snyderville at its known address, by and through any 
-managing or general agent, or other agent authorized to 
receive service of process . . . .,- Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(5), 
one of two things would have happened, either of which would 
have served counsel's purposes. The return would have come 
back indicating service was effected on Snyderville by and 
through its managing partner, Jim Gaddis, in which event 
personal service would be complete, or the return would have 
come back with an "unable to serve" notation, with explanation 
of the constable's failure to locate at the address any person 
having knowledge of Snyderville despite diligent inquiry, in 
which event the entitlement to serve by publication would be 
ironclad given the extensive other efforts exerted by counsel. 
7. We note that any defendant served by publication has 
standing to challenge the sufficiency of service of process, 
Carlson, 740 P.2d at 1271, even where authorized by an order 
which, as here, is not directly attacked. 
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Since service by publication on Snyderville was not warranted, 
such service was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over 
Snyderville. Sfifi Hustace v. Kapuni, 6 Haw. App. 241, 718 P.2d 
1109, 1116 (1986) (where service by publication is 
insufficient, subsequent default judgment is void ab initio). 
DISMISSAL 
The thrust of Weber's challenge of the ultimate dismissal 
of the complaint as against Snyderville is that the court 
failed to "issue a brief written statement of the ground for 
its decision," as is required on all motions granted under 
Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56 and 59 when the motion is based 
on more than one ground." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Weber points 
out that Snyderville advanced arguments for dismissal under 
both Rule 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) and therefore Rule 52(a) is 
applicable. We agree, noting however that Weber did not raise 
this issue below. 
m Alford v, Utah League of Cities and Towns, 791 P.2d 
201, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), we held that failure to protest 
the trial court's apparent noncompliance with Rule 52 at the 
trial level precludes consideration of the omission on 
appeal.8 Weber should have raised the issue with the trial 
8. Without minimizing the importance of the written statement 
required by Rule 52(a), which acquaints both the parties and 
any reviewing court of the trial court's rationale, we note 
that even if the plaintiff had raised the issue of a written 
statement of grounds before the trial court and the court had 
not filed its written statement as required by Rule 52(a), we 
would likely conclude that the omission was harmless error. 
££. Burnett v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(1990) (where trial court did not identify reason for 
dismissal, Supreme Court assumed dismissal was premised on one 
or both of the grounds advanced in motion to dismiss and 
affirmed after considering only one of those grounds, and 
determining it was well-taken); Tavlor v. Estate of Tavlor, 770 
P.2d 163, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (where trial court did not 
state basis for judgment, appellate court considered grounds 
advanced in motion for summary judgment and affirmed upon 
concluding judgment was properly premised on one of such 
grounds); Dover Elev. Co. v. Hill Manaum Investment, 766 P.2d 
424, 426 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (where trial court did not 
state basis for judgment on stipulated facts, appellate court 
noted similarity to cross-motions for summary judgment and 
merely noted that "a 'brief written statement of the ground' 
for the court's disposition would have been appropriate"). 
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i 
court, thereby giving the court the opportunity to cure the ' 
problem. 
We may. affirm the trial court on any proper ground. 
Ruehner Block Co. v. UWC Assons.. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 
1988). Thus, if dismissal in this case can be sustained either
 i 
on Rule 12(b)(5) or 12(b)(6) grounds, we will affirm. ££. 
Burnett v. Utah Power & Light Co., 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1990) 
(where trial court did not identify reason for dismissal, 
Supreme Court assumed dismissal was premised on one or both of 
the grounds advanced in motion to dismiss and affirmed after 
considering only one of those grounds, and determining it was < 
well-taken). 
Weber has limited her argument on dismissal insofar as 
premised on Rule 12(b)(5) to an incorporation by reference of 
her arguments that Snyderville was sufficiently served either 
through personal service on Gaddis or by publication. We have i 
treated these arguments above and found both to be without 
merit. Given the limited scope of Weber's 12(b)(5) argument, 
it follows that the order of dismissal should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Snyderville West was not properly served either 
personally or by publication, the default judgment entered 
against it was properly set aside. Because Weber has raised no 
argument demonstrating error in dismissal on Rule 12(b)(5) 
grounds, the order of dismissal will not be disturbed. 
Affirmed. 
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? such thoughts would tend to interfere 
icir concentration on defendant's guilt 
icence. Any discussion or thought of an 
riate sentence should come only after a 
iuation ol guilt, 
.onchidc that the City failed to meet its 
to rebut the presumption of prejudice, 
liliff's testimony, standing alone, was 
licient to show that the jury had not in 
en influenced by the conversation. Nor 
bailiff's testimony remove the taint of 
riety caused by his earlier conversation, 
id there was insufficient evidence to 
a careful, reasoned decision and ther-
lie court abused its discretion in conci-
lia! the jury was not prejudiced by the 
er contact, 
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cannot be overcome even with testi-
fy the "tainted" juror that he or she 
>t "influenced by the encounter." Id. 
T the juror contact is by "witnesses, 
ys, or court personnel" is irrelevant. Id. 
cope and subject matter of the conver-
," so long as more than mere pleasan-
nd, in the case of witnesses, the relative 
ince of the witness to the prosecution, 
io irrelevant. Compare Larocco, 742 
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•n, 749 P.2d 620. 
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OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
This is an appeal by plaintiff Brenda Major 
Weber1 challenging interlocutory and final 
orders setting aside a default judgment in 
favor of plaintiff and dismissing defendant 
Snyderville West ("Snyderville") as a party to 
an action to quiet title to real property. This 
appeal primarily focuses on the sufficiency of 
service of process on Snyderville. 
FACTS 
On April 6, 1983, Steven W. Major filed a 
complaint to quiet title to eleven parcels of 
real estate located in Summit County. Snyde-
rville, a Utah general partnership, and Jim 
Gaddis were two of seventy named defend-
ants.2 Jim Gaddis holds a ten-percent interest 
in Snyderville and is its managing partner. 
In 1978, Snyderville purchased from Inve-
stor Associates a portion of the property at 
issue in the quiet title action. Robert W. 
Major executed the pertinent real estate cont-
ract on behalf of Investor Associates. Snyde-
rville took possession of the property and 
made timely payments, with the final payment 
being made on July 20, 1983. In October 
1983, Snyderville recorded a warranty deed for 
the property given to it by Investor Associates. 
Snyderville paid property taxes on the parcel 
through October 1987, when it learned that 
the trial court had divested it of title by means 
of a default judgment against it. 
From the time it took possession of the 
address on the Summit County tax records. 
No filing in the appropriate county or state 
offices revealed the name of any individual 
affiliated with Snyderville nor did Snyderville 
have a telephone directory listing. Although 
Gaddis was served in his individual capacity at 
his office on May II, 1983, the summons 
served upon him was directed to him individ-
ually and made no reference to Snyderville 
except in the lengthy caption listing all seventy 
defendants. The return of service indicated 
that Gaddis had been served personally and 
did not purport that service on Snyderville had 
been effected through him. By order dated 
December 17, 1983, the trial court allowed 
service by publication upon Snyderville and 
sixteen other named defendants. 
As a corollary to service by publication, 
counsel for Weber prepared a summons for 
mailing to Snyderville at its tax address, i.e., 
Gaddis's office at 1253 East 2100 South in 
Salt Lake City. 
The affidavit of mailing listed Snyderville's 
address as "1253 East 7100 South," incorrectly 
stating the south coordinate by fifty blocks. 
Although there is no such address, and, acc-
ording to a Postal Service supervisor's affid-
avit, the summons directed to Snyderville 
should have been returned by the Postal 
Service, counsel for Weber did not recall that 
the summons had been returned, although 
other summonses were returned for insuffic-
ient postage. The Postal Service does not keep 
records of returned first class mail and it is 
therefore unknown if the mailed summons 
ever reached Snyderville. Gaddis had no rec-
ollection of receiving a summons through the 
mail. 
The trial court entered a default judgment 
against Snyderville on August 29, 1985. In the 
fall of 1988, Snyderville sought to have the 
judgment set aside. The district court deter-
mined that there was "no adequate explana-
tion ... (for the] failure to personally serve 
Snyderville West at its known tax address" 
and set aside the judgment. In 1989, Snyder-
ville filed a Motion to Dismiss premised on 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), which 
was granted. This appeal followed. 
On appeal, Weber claims that Snyderville 
was effectively served through personal service 
upon Jim Gaddis or, alternatively, that it was 
properly served by publication. Weber also 
challenges the court's order of dismissal in 
favor of Snyderville as improper under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 52(a).* 
PERSONAL SERVICE 
Weber asserts that Gaddis's position as 
managing partner of Snyderville qualified him 
to receive service of process for Snyderville. 
Weber further claims that service upon Gaddis 
|S«I»IIV.I a i i u m a J i a i u s a s a p a i l l i c i . vv c clglC 
that Gaddis was authorized to receive proce; 
for Snyderville. See Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)0 
(service upon a partnership shall be effectiv 
through service upon managing or genen 
agent). However, personal service upo 
Gaddis did not confer jurisdiction over Snj 
derville. Weber incorrectly focuses o 
Gaddis's capacity, rather than the import c 
the summons served upon him. Any numbc 
of agents or partners of Snyderville might b 
authorized to receive service for the partnei 
ship, yet if no service is ever attempted on th 
partnership no service on it can be perfected.4 
Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce 
dure states, with our emphasis: "The summon 
shall contain the ... names ... of the parties U 
the action ... (and] be directed to the defen 
dant." Gaddis's summons was directed t< 
him, not to Snyderville. While this might hav 
provided Snyderville with constructive or eve 
actual knowledge of the action, the insuffici 
ency of process is not thereby cured. See Ston 
v. Hicks. 45 N.C. App. 66, 262 S.E.2d 318 
319 (1980) (where one defendant received 
summons directed to another defendant 
service was ineffective on the receiving defe 
ndant even though the caption listed him as 
defendant). See generally 62B Am. Jur. 2d Pre 
cess section 81 (1990). We hold that servic 
of process upon Jim Gaddis in his individus 
capacity did not effect service of proces 
upon, nor confer jurisdiction over, Snyderv 
ille. 
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION 
Rule 4 ( 0 ( 0 of the Utah Rules of Civ 
Procedure, in effect at all times pertinent t< 
this case,9 authorized service by publicatioi 
when personal service is impractical becaus 
the 
person upon whom service is sought 
resides outside of the state, or has 
departed from the state, or cannot 
after due diligence be found within 
the state.. . . 
The party desiring service of 
process by publication shall file a 
motion verified by the oath of such 
party or someone in his behalf for 
an order of publication. It shall 
state the facts authorizing such 
service and shall show the efforts 
that have been made to obtain 
personal service within this state .... 
The court shall hear the motion ex 
parte and, if satisfied that due dil-
igence has been used to obtain 
personal service within this state, or 
that efforts to obtain the same 
would have been of no avail, shall 
order publication of the summons 
in a newspaper having general cir-
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to locate the defendant before the court I 
luthorize service by publication. "Due 
ice must be tailored to fit the circumst-
of each case. It is that diligence which is j 
priate to accomplish the end sought and 
is reasonably calculated to do so." Parker 
its, 117 Utah 417, 217 P.2d 373, 
950). See also Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 
1277 n.13 (Utah 1987). 
insel for Weber was faced with the task 
ting through numerous disorganized files 
ning Robert Major's personal and bus-
affairs. Many documents were held by 
' members and former counsel. At the 
>f trial, counsel could not recall whether 
j seen any documents specifically linking 
rville and Gaddis or any contracts or 
concerning the conveyance to Snyderv-
long the records he examined, 
fdcrville first came to p la in t i f f ' s 
el's attention in a June 1982 title report 
ng Snyderville's interest, 
an effort to locate information he cons-
I necessary to serve Snyderville, counsel 
[ied in telephone directories, motor 
e files, corporate filings in Utah and 
>rnia, the County Recorder's files in 
[lit and Salt Lake counties, and in postal 
is. It is apparent, however, that Snyde-
s address was set forth in the Summit 
y tax records pertaining to the very 
:rty in issue. Counsel's quest was appa-
' for the name of a particular individual 
o Snyderville through whom service upon 
erville could be perfected. Oddly , 
ver, no inquiry was made by counsel at 
ddress disclosed as Snyderville's address 
te tax records, of which counsel had 
ledge no later than October 1983, nor 
my service of process attempted on Sny-
lle at this address.6 Had either been done, 
T would readily have been able to pers-
y serve Snyderville through Gaddis, 
e office was the very address stated in the 
:cords. 
plaintiff seeking authorization for service 
iblication on a defendant for whom an in-
address is known must, at a minimum, 
: inquiry at that address. Cf. Downey 
Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 
507, 509 (Utah 1976) (plaintiff need not 
jst all possibilities where there is an effort 
rve defendant at the only address reaso-
t known). This requirement is not only a 
quisite for satisfying the due diligence 
g of Rule 4, but will also go a long way 
tablishing a proper factual record upon 
h the court may base its order for service 
ublication. Service by publication is ina-
priate where no personal inquiry is made 
last known address within the state.7 Since 
Hustace v. Kapum, o Maw. App. z«i , / i o 
P.2d 1109, 1116 (1986) (where service by 
publication is insufficient, subsequent default 
judgment is void ab initio). 
DISMISSAL 
The thrust of Weber's challenge of the 
ultimate dismissal of the complaint as against 
Snyderville is that the court failed to "issue a 
brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision," as is required on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56 
and 59 when the motion is based on more 
than one ground." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Weber points out that Snyderville advanced 
arguments for dismissal under both Rule 
12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) and therefore Rule 52(a) 
is applicable. We agree, noting however that 
Weber did not raise this issue below. 
In Alford v. Utah League of Cities and 
Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), we held that failure to protest the trial 
court 's apparent noncompliance with Rule 52 
at the trial level precludes consideration of the 
omission on appeal .1 Weber should have 
raised the issue with the trial court, thereby 
giving the court the opportunity to cure the 
problem. 
We may affirm the trial court on any proper 
ground. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). Thus, if dis-
missal in this case can be sustained either on 
Rule 12(b)(5) or 12(b)(6) grounds, we will 
affirm. Cf. Burnett v. Utah Power & Light 
Co., 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1990) (where trial 
court did not identify reason for dismissal, 
Supreme Court assumed dismissal was prem-
ised on one or both of the grounds advanced 
in motion to dismiss and affirmed after con-
sidering only one of those grounds, and dete-
rmining it was well-taken). 
Weber has limited her argument on dismi-
ssal insofar as premised on Rule 12(b)(5) to an 
incorporation by reference of her arguments 
that Snyderville was sufficiently served either 
through personal service on Gaddis or by 
publication. We have treated these arguments 
above and found both to be without merit. 
Given the limited scope of Weber's 12(b)(5) 
argument, it follows that the order of dismi-
ssal should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Snyderville West was not properly 
served either personally or by publication, the 
default judgment entered against it was pro-
perly set aside. Because Weber has raised no 
argument demonstrating error in dismissal on 
Rule 12(b)(5) grounds, the order of dismissal 
will not be disturbed. Affirmed. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. This action was originally brought by Steven W. 
Major, personal representative of the estate of 
Robert W. Major, Jr. During the course of the liti-
gation Steven W. Major died and the present plai-
ntiff was named as successor personal representa-
tive. 
2. As may be expected in litigation involving num-
erous parties and several transactions, the facts 
before the court are numerous and complicated. We 
commend counsel for both parties for their succinct 
presentation of the relevant facts. We further note 
that both parties* careful compliance with Utah R. 
App. P. 24 has assisted the court in efficiently dec-
iding the matters before it. Of particular assistance 
to the court was the comprehensive addenda of key 
documents annexed to the briefs. 
3. Weber also claims that, notwithstanding any 
deficiencies in service of process, Snyderville is 
bound by a stipulation for settlement and the judg-
ment entered thereon on January 17, 1986, by 
reason of the fact Gaddis, through his own counsel, 
was a party to the stipulation. We find no merit in 
this argument nor in Weber's lis pendens argument, 
raised for the first time in her reply brief. 
4. Weber's claim that service on Gaddis was adeq-
uate to serve the partnership is belied by Weber's 
own course of conduct. If she believed Snyderville 
had been properly served through Gaddis there 
would have been no need to include it in the motion 
seeking leave to serve by publication, in the order 
authorizing publication or in the published 
summons, nor to undertake efforts to mail the 
published summons to Snyderville. 
5. The comparable rule now appears at Utah R. 
Civ. P. 4(g). 
6. Apparently counsel thought that unless he could 
advise the constable of the name and title of a par-
ticular person through whom Snyderville could be 
served, he could not appropriately seek service of 
Snyderville at the address of which he was aware. A 
personal visit to the address would presumably have 
elicited such information. But such information is 
not necessarily required. Had counsel simply advised 
the constable to serve Snyderville at its known 
address, by and through any "managing or general 
agent, or other agent authorized to receive service of 
process * Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(5), one of two 
things would have happened, either of which would 
have served counsel's purposes. The return would 
have come back indicating service was effected on 
Snyderville by and through its managing partner, 
Jim Gaddis, in which event personal service would 
be complete, or the return would have come back 
with an "unable to serve" notation, with explanation 
of the constable's failure to locate at the address 
any person having knowledge of Snyderville despite 
diligent inquiry, in which event the entitlement to 
serve by publication would be ironclad given the 
extensive other efforts exerted by counsel. 
7. We note that any defendant served by publication 
has standing to challenge the sufficiency of service 
of process, Carlson, 740 P.2d at 1271, even where 
authorized by an order which, as here, is not dire-
ctly attacked. 
8. Without minimizing the importance of the written 
statement required by Rule 52(a), which acquaints 
both the parties and any reviewing court of the trial 
we would likely conclude that the omission i 
harmless error. Cf. Burnett v. Utah Power & L\ 
Co.. 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1990) (where trial cc 
did not identify reason for dismissal. Supreme Cc 
assumed dismissal was premised on one or both 
the grounds advanced in motion to dismiss i 
affirmed after considering only one of th 
grounds, and determining it was well-taken); Taylo 
Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 168 (U 
Ct. App. 1989) (where trial court did not state b 
for judgment, appellate court considered grou 
advanced in motion for summary judgment ; 
affirmed upon concluding judgment was prop 
premised on one of such grounds); Dover Elev. 
v. Hill Mangum Investment, 766 P.2d 424, 426 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (where trial court did not si 
basis for judgment on stipulated facts, appel 
court noted similarity to cross-motions 
summary judgment and merely noted that "a *b 
written statement of the ground' for the cou 
disposition would have been appropriate"). 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Randall D. Tucker appeals his convicl 
for theft, a third degree felony, in violatior 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6 404 (1990). 
affirm. 
On March 29, 1989, Mr. Hansen drove 
his property near Redwood Road wher 
locked storage shed containing his son's | 
sessions was located. Mr. Hansen found < 
A 
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